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Does poverty relief spending reduce crime? 
Evidence from Argentina  
 
 
Abstract. 
A large body of empirical research suggests that welfare spending reduces 
crime. Contrary to this dominant finding, a few recent studies conclude that 
there is no relationship between several measures of welfare spending and 
serious crime. This paper contributes to the debate using data from the 
largest poverty alleviation program launched by the Argentinean government 
to cope with the deleterious effects of the 2002 crisis featuring double-digit 
unemployment and half of the population below the poverty line. Province –
level dynamic panel data reveals that the cash transfers program had a 
negative impact total crime although the effect was rather weak. The 
analyses of various types of crime show that the influence of the Argentine 
poverty relief spending was greater in Property Crimes than Crime against 
Persons, with the highest effect on larceny. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to explore the impact of the poverty alleviation program 
launched by the Argentine government to cope with the deleterious effects of the 
2002 crisis on various types of crime. Additionally, it embeds the findings for the 
Argentine case within the broader empirical debate regarding the effect of welfare 
programs on delinquency.  
Few years ago the copious literature on crime seemed to have arrived at a 
consensus on the influence of relief spending programs on crime. The evidence from 
various U.S. data sets fitted the theoretical argument, rooted in Becker (1968) 
seminal contribution that transfers to the needed individuals increase the opportunity 
cost of committing crime (Defronzo, 1983 and 1996; Zhang, 1997; Chamlin et al., 
2002). Nonetheless, Worral (2005) has challenged that view presenting empirical 
evidence and theoretical arguments for little or no connection between serious crime 
and poverty relief spending1. He argues that the resulting negative correlation 
between crime and economic assistance obtained in several empirical studies comes 
mainly from cross-sectional data, and therefore not controlling for fluctuations of the 
dependent variable over time. Further, he claims that a small amount of welfare 
transfer is unlikely to change individual attitudes towards crime. This is a key point. 
Relief transfers might help divert individuals “specialized” in minor offenses like 
larceny, petty theft or shoplifting from illegal to legal activities, because the 
investment necessary to participate in those activities is very small, but might not be 
enough to dissuade offenders dedicated to more sophisticated crimes like robbery 
and auto theft that require higher degree of investment in both, human capital and 
inputs.  
Recent evidence from U.S. and international panel data by Johnson et al. (2007) and 
Savage et al. (2009) respectively, showing negative impact of welfare spending on 
property crime, added interest to the discussion. This paper contributes to this 
empirical debate by offering evidence from Argentina, an emerging economy that 
suffered a severe downturn in 2002, compelling the federal government to alleviate 
poverty by means of a massive cash transfer program that reached almost two 
million beneficiaries (20% of the labor force) in the first half of 2003. I estimate a 
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 Homicide, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary and larceny are considered serious crimes for Worral (2005). 
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dynamic panel data that spans 23 districts for the period 1st semester 2002 to 2nd 
semester 2005, when the program had a widespread coverage, before substitution 
by several specific poverty-alleviation programs.  
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical 
and empirical literature linking welfare spending and crime. Section 3 describes the 
Argentine socioeconomic context during the period 2002 -2005 and the 
characteristics of the Unemployed-Headed Household Program (UHHP). Section 4 
details the data and econometric specification, while Section 5 supplies the empirical 
results and explores the possible mechanisms behind those results. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Economic conditions, Criminal Activity and Welfare Spending 
For analytical purposes, the relationship between criminal activity and welfare 
spending can be split in two separate (but closely related) links. On one hand, there 
is a connection between economic conditions and crime that has been extensively 
studied, in particular the unemployment–crime link (Paternoster and Bushway, 2001; 
Kleck and Chiricos, 2002; Yearwood and Koinis, 2009; Arvanites and Defina, 2006) 
and the inequality and crime association (Kelly, 2000; Brush, 2007; Choe, 2008; 
Scorzafave and Soares, 2009). Following Becker (1968), an individual engages in an 
illicit activity only if its expected net value is higher than the expected gain from a 
legal activity. Hence, any deterioration in the labor market that changes the return of 
legal vis a vis illegal activities, like  job loss, wage cuts or reduction in extra hours, is 
expected to augment the crime rate. Nonetheless, this effect may be offset by 
shrinking crime opportunities in a declining economy. As explained by Cantor and 
Land (1985), there are two opposite forces at work over the business cycle: 
motivation and opportunity. Recessions increase motivation to commit crime but may 
be counteracted by diminishing opportunities as the economy gets poorer2. The 
opposite occurs in recoveries. Opportunities increase pari passu with the widespread 
availability of goods and profitable illegal activities but can be counterbalanced by 
diminishing motivation.  
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unemployment and underemployment, which reduces the opportunity cost of offenses.  Social control is described 
as the ability of society to regulate its members through formal and informal norms. See Arvanites and Defina 
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On the other hand, there is a connection between welfare spending and crime that 
has received much less attention in the literature. The main argument is that welfare 
payments to disadvantaged individuals change their time allocation between legal 
and illegal activities favoring the former in detriment of the latter. Zhang (1997) 
presents a model with risk averse individuals that respond to cash transfers by 
diminishing crime rate. The intuition is simple; an increase in welfare payments 
reduces the marginal utility of a marginal gain from illegal activities. Zhang’s empirical 
evidence from U.S. state-level data for the year 1987 shows that in-kind and cash 
transfers were negatively and significantly associated with property crime3. Similar 
conclusions were reached by DeFronzo in a couple of very well known cross 
sectional studies with unambiguous policy implications. In DeFronzo (1983) the level 
of public assistance to poor families in 39 U.S. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(SMSA) in 1970 was found to have negative effect on the variation of several crime 
rates, including rates of homicide, rape, and burglary. The same sign for the welfare-
crime correlation was obtained by DeFronzo (1996) that focused on the impact of Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Program on burglary in 141 U.S. cities.  
At the turn of the century the sign of the welfare spending-crime connection seemed 
to admit no further discussion despite the scarce evidence from longitudinal or panel 
data studies4. Worral (2005) confronted that view on theoretical as well as empirical 
grounds. He used panel data from California counties and concludes that there was 
little to no relationship between serious crime (homicide, robbery, assault, burglary or 
larceny) and social welfare spending during the period 1990–98. Moreover, he claims 
that individual attitudes towards crime are unlikely to change due to small amount 
welfare transfers.  
The debate was revived by Burek (2005) that obtained a positive association 
between the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program with property 
crimes, working with a panel data including 180 counties in Kentucky from 1980 to 
1990. She relied on several hypotheses to explain such challenging result. Firstly, 
low levels of AFDC assistance may leave potential offenders with a large number of 
unmet needs for which larceny can effectively supplement. Secondly, welfare may 
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 Different from Zhang(1997) I am not addressing the question about the appropriate welfare spending but the 
impact of a particular relief program on crime 
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 Chamlin et al. (2002) is an example of longitudinal analysis of the welfare spending-crime relationship. They 
found a negative association between the number of welfare recipients per month and the monthly level of family 
homicides. 
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weaken control that family and employment have over community behaviors. 
Moreover, welfare may influence the breakdown of family (fathers leave home 
because a mother traditionally could not be married to collect welfare) and may also 
discourage parents from seeking gainful employment in the job market because 
eligibility rules require that the parent be unemployed what leaves them with free time 
for illegal activities 
In another provocative paper, Burek (2006) obtained no association between two 
categories of crime (instrumental” and “expressive”) and relief spending for 81 
counties in Iowa’s in 2000. On the contrary, Johnson et al. (2007) found a negative 
impact of relief spending by all levels of government on crime rates for 81 large 
American cities for the years of the Great Depression, 1930 through 19405. Their 
estimations suggest that a ten percent increase in relief spending during the 1930s 
lowered property crime by roughly 1.5 percent. They found that work relief was more 
effective than direct relief (cash transfers) in reducing crime because the former 
limited the amount of free time for relief recipients. 
The majority of empirical studies deal with U.S. data. Only recently Savage et al. 
(2008) analyzed various hypotheses regarding the connection between crime and 
welfare spending and its causality with a panel data of 52 countries and 13-year 
period from 1972 to 1984. Their estimations suggest that a 10 percent increase in 
social welfare spending generates, on average, 2.3 percent lower theft rates and 3.3 
percent lower homicide rates. They conjecture that social welfare affects crime 
directly (in the sort-run), by mitigating the effects of inequality and indirectly (in the 
long-run), by decreasing absolute deprivation, improving early health care and 
increasing the chances of a better education. 
3. Crisis, Social Distress and Crime in Argentina  
Argentina is constitutionally organized as a federal republic with 23 provinces and an 
autonomous federal district, the city of Buenos Aires. In 2002 Argentina suffered the 
deepest crisis in its history. The ten-year old currency board that had been 
established by law in the early 1990s to stabilize the economy and promote growth, 
collapsed following devaluation, massive capital outflows and the world largest debt 
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 According to Burke (2006) instrumental crimes yield monetary or material gain rather than emotional 
satisfaction. Conversely, expressive crimes are committed to resolve issues of anger, the desire for control, 
frustration, and/ or despair. Crimes such as homicide, aggravated assaults, and rapes are considered to be 
expressive in nature. 
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default ever. GDP plunged 11% and consumer price inflation escalated to 26%. The 
contraction of the economic activity reduced labor demand, particularly the demand 
for unskilled workers. The unemployment and underemployment rates peaked 20% 
and 12% respectively in the first half of 2003. More than 50% of the population fell 
below the poverty line and almost a third of the total urban population starved. The 
poor had limited or no access to credit markets and lacked assets to hedge against 
employment shocks and the inflation tax that deteriorated their wealth and income. 
Moreover, the rapid currency depreciation increased the price of tradable relative to 
non-tradable goods, hurting the poor via fall in real wages. Middle income population 
also suffered since bank deposits denominated in U.S. dollars were partially 
confiscated by the government. Massive protests and rallies of unemployed and 
depositors contributed to social unrest. Table 1 presents the behavior of some key 
socioeconomic variables at the of peak the crisis  
Table 1. Socioeconomic impact of the Crisis  
 Percentage of the 
population under the 
poverty line 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate 
Unemployment 
rate 
Underemployment 
Rate 
Country 
average 
52.5 
(1st half 2003) 
16.8 
(Year 2002) 
20.0 
(1st half 2003) 
12.2 
(1st half 2003) 
Province or 
Urban area 
with the 
highest  
rate 
74.9 
(City of Corrientes -1st half 2003) 
26.7 
(Province of 
Chaco – 2002) 
22.7 
(Greater Rosario 
-1st half 2003) 
17.6 
(Greater San Miguel 
de Tucuman -1st half 
2003) 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC) 
 
The extreme socioeconomic circumstances impelled the federal government to 
launch a cash transfer program called Unemployed-Headed Household Program 
(Programa Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados) to alleviate poverty. The program 
transferred 150 pesos per unemployed household with pregnant women or children 
under 18 years old living at home, which represented about 14.6% of the average 
salary of the public sector and about 75% of the minimum wage6.  
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The Program started in May 2002 with 574,434 recipients across the country but 
increased sharply, reaching its maximum in May 2003, with 1,990,735 beneficiaries 
that represented almost 20% of the total labor force of Argentina and 146% of the 
total employment in the provincial public sector of the 24 jurisdictions (see Table 2). 
By the end of 2005 the number of beneficiaries had decreased to approximately 
1,539,000 due to the improving economic conditions and the introduction of new 
poverty alleviation programs focused on vulnerable segments of the population like 
Family Plan (Plan Familias para la Inclusion Social), Adults Program (Programa 
Adulto Mayor Más) and Hands at Work (Plan Manos a la Obra). The intense 
migration from the Unemployed–Headed Household Program to the Family Plan 
explains the abrupt fall of the number of recipients from 2006 on. In April 2007, the 
number of recipients was less than one million and in September 2008 less than half 
million. 
Table 2. Number of beneficiaries of the Unemployed-Headed Household 
Program from 2002 to 2005 (monthly average)  
 
Year Semester Number of Beneficiaries 
Rate of growth (%) 
2002 
1st 877,266  
2nd 1,707,081 94.6 
2003 
1st 1,955,824 14.6 
2nd 1,887,865 -3.5 
2004 
1st 1,757,362 -6.9 
2nd 1,622,638 -7.7 
2005 
1st 1,559,260 -3.9 
2nd 1,538,969 -1.3 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC 
Note: The program distributed cash transfers from May 2002. 
 
Crime in times of Crisis 
For most of the 20th century Argentina could proudly show the lowest crime rates in 
America. But stating in the 1980s crime rate climbed uninterruptedly until 2002, 
reaching a historical record of 3697 offenses per 100,000 inhabitants, more than the 
triple of the rate registered in 1983 (Cerro and Meloni, 1999 and 2000). To 
preexisting conditions characterized by very low deterrence, high unemployment 
rates and impairing income inequality, the 2002 crisis added a context of social 
9 
turbulence that spurred crimes rates. In 2002 total crime grew 13.8% and property 
crimes 19.7% with respect to 2001. Interestingly, the types of property crime that 
registered the highest rates of growth were larceny and robbery with 22.9% and 
22.8% respectively. As economic conditions improved and social control was 
restored crimes rates descended to values prevailing in 2000/20017. 
Figure 1. Evolution of Total Crime, property Crime and Crime against Persons 
 
Source: Direccion Nacional de Politica Criminal. Ministerio del Interior. 
 
4. Econometric Specification and Data 
In order to study the conjectured connection between welfare spending and criminal 
activity I work with a panel data that comprises 23 out of 24 Argentine provinces and 
8 consecutive semesters from the first half of 2002 to the second half of 2005. I 
excluded the province of Rio Negro from my analysis because control variables such 
as unemployment and income distributions measures were not available for most of 
the sample. By focusing on a single country this paper exploits within-country 
variation. This is a remarkable source of variation that goes beyond cross-country 
empirical studies. I estimate the following linear equation where criminal activity is 
assumed to depend on its lagged value, the number of beneficiaries of the poverty 
alleviation program and several socio economic variables to account for variability in 
the data due to factors other than poverty relief. That is,  
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εββββ itjitjititit CONTROLSRELIEFCrimeCrime +++= +− 32110   (I) 
Where i indexes jurisdictions and t represents time (half years) 
Dependent variables 
I test the impact of poverty relief program on seven variables measuring criminal 
activity: total crime rate, property crime, robbery, larceny, crime against persons, 
aggravated assault and homicide. Property crimes represented 65% of total offenses 
in the period under study and its two main categories, robbery and larceny, 
accounted for 32% and 27% of total crime respectively. Likewise, crime against 
persons explained 18% of total crime and the share of aggravated assault and 
homicide were 11% and 0.2% correspondingly. 
Key Independent Variable 
The independent variable of primary interest in my analysis is RELIEF, defined as the 
monthly average of number of beneficiary of the Unemployed–Headed Household 
Program per 1000 inhabitants in a given district and semester.   
Controlling socioeconomic influences  
My empirical study includes a series of socioeconomic control variables which have 
been found in the extant literature to explain the behavior of different categories of 
crime rate. I include the unemployment rate to capture the effect of the implicit price 
of legal relative to illegal activities. In Cantor and Land (1985) language, the increase 
in unemployment rate augments the motivation for crime, particularly property crimes. 
To account for additional influences of weak labor market, I construct another 
variable that adds the rate of underemployment to the rate of unemployment.  
Following the abundant literature on crime determinants I include the Gini coefficient 
to reflect the impact of income distribution on crime. I assume that the greater the 
baseline level of Gini Coefficient in the province, the higher the criminal activity. 
Alternative measures of income inequality like the Theil and Entropia indices were 
also considered.  
I incorporate the collection of turnover tax per capita as a proxy for economic activity. 
The usual variable to capture the opportunity effect on crime is GDP per capita but it 
is only available on annual basis. The turnover tax is a provincial duty applied to 
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sales in every stage of production. On average, turnover tax accounted for 60% of 
local tax collection in the period 2002-2006. I expect improving economic conditions 
to increase the income of legal activities relative to the illegal ones and therefore to 
be negatively correlated to crime rates, particularly property crimes. In addition to the 
socioeconomic control variables discussed above I also include Population Density to 
account for the fact that crime is higher in highly populated areas.  
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the variables included in the econometric 
estimations. The coding of each variable is shown in the Appendix8. These data show 
clear differences in the chronological behavior of property crimes and crime against 
persons. Property offenses increased sharply from the beginning of the period, 
peaking in first semester of 2003 and then decreasing slowly to reach the values 
prevalent in the first half of 2002. Conversely, crime against persons and its main 
category, aggravated assault, show an upward tendency all along the period. The 
exception to this behavior is the homicide rate that present a V-form reaching its 
maximum in 2002.  
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics.  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
Total Crime 184 1869.89 649.82 764.04 3400.52 
  Property Crime 184 1234.50 512.23 361.92 2512.92 
    Robbery 184 507.64 273.82 148.05 1296.54 
    Larceny 184 565.64 258.73 130.29 1254.01 
  Crime against Persons 184 328.24 117.14 118.26 672.64 
    Aggravated Assault  184 212.69 81.79 29.8 453.74 
    Homicide 184 2.77 1.52 0 8.58 
Key Explanatory Variable 
Relief 184 46.11 26.14 4.8 110.8 
Socio economic controls 
Turnover tax Collection (pesos per 
capita) 184 10.49 9.36 1.13 47.59 
Unemployment (%) 184 12.27 5.43 0.7 25.5 
Gini  184 0.51 0.06 0.375 0.72 
Density (inhabitants per squared 
kilometers)  184 668.13 3078.79 0.084 15128.86 
Note: numbers of districts: 23; numbers of periods: 8 (half-years) 
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Data  
Crime data were obtained from the Dirección Nacional de Política Criminal, Ministerio 
de Justicia y Derechos Humanos (www.jus.gov.ar). Argentine authorities classify 
crime data in six categories: crime against persons, sex offenses, crime against the 
State and the Community, crime against liberty, property crime and other crimes. But 
only crime against persons and property crimes are officially available on a monthly 
basis. Crime against persons consists of Homicides, Aggravated Assault and other 
crimes. Crimes against property comprise Robbery, Larceny and other property 
crimes. The well-known under-reporting bias that affects property crimes is expected 
to be correlated with some of the explanatory variables. 
The source for the number of beneficiaries of the Unemployed-Headed Household 
Program (Programa Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados) was Ministerio del 
Interior. Data on population, unemployment and underemployment come from the 
Argentinean Bureau of Statistics named Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos 
(INDEC). The Rate of Unemployment is defined as total unemployed (People who 
are jobless, looking for jobs, and available for work) as percentage of civilian labor 
force. Underemployment, instead, is defined as total involuntary employed part time 
(less than 25 hours per week), as a percent of the civilian labor force.  
The Gini Coefficient and other measures of income inequality like the Theil and 
Entropia were computed by the Instituto de Estudios Laborales y del Desarrollo 
Económico (IELDE), Universidad Nacional de Salta from Household Surveys perform 
by INDEC. Tax collection data were obtained from Dirección Nacional de 
Coordinación Fiscal con las Provincias, Ministerio de Economía (www.mecon.gov.ar)  
5. Regression results  
Table 4 presents estimations of equation (I) for the selected crime categories. 
Regressions (1), (3), (5), (6), (7), (9) and (11) display the estimations of the full model 
for each independent crime variable while regression (2), (4), (8), (10) and (12) only 
contain control variables that pass the .10 level of significance, so they are the ones 
upon which I base my conclusions. Notice that regressions (5) and (6) having 
Robbery and Larceny as dependent variables present all explanatory variables at 
usual levels of significance.  
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Table 4. Does Welfare Spending affect crime?  
Estimation Method: GMM (Arellano-Bond) with robust standard errors 
Variables 
Dependent variables 
Total Crime Property Crime Burglary Larceny Crime against persons Aggravated assault Murder 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Lagged 
dependent 
variable 
0.0701 
(0.2110) 
0.1887 
(0.1675) 
0.4998*** 
(0.1631) 
0.6135*** 
(0.1317) 
0.3102** 
(0.1311) 
0.4452*** 
(0.1384) 
0.1904 
(0.1619) 
0.2170 
0.1677 
0.0646 
(0.1394) 
0.0423 
(0.1440) 
0.0670 
(0.0893) 
0.0731 
(0.0827 
Relief 
-8.4778** 
(4.3295) 
-8.5211** 
(4.1140) 
-9.9408*** 
(2.5864) 
-10.339*** 
(2.5257) 
-2.7128*** 
(0.8908) 
-5.3026*** 
(1.6894) 
-1.0906 
(0.7191) 
-1.1685* 
(0.6515) 
-1.3727** 
(0.6319) 
-1.2875** 
(0.6153) 
-0.0097 
(0.0153) 
-0.0065 
(0.0140 
Activity 
-15.8552 
(10.0550) 
-20.3266* 
(10.8206) 
-15.9415** 
(6.9503) 
-18.453** 
(7.5946) 
-6.5866** 
(2.7502) 
-8.7054*** 
(3.0720) 
-0.1167 
(1.5604)  
-0.9052 
1.1170  
-0.0423 
(0.0453)  
Unemploymen
t 
8.5476 
(5.6553) 
13.3048** 
(5.4610) 
9.5309** 
(4.6987) 
11.4259** 
(4.5105) 
4.6630*** 
(1.6633) 
6.7307** 
(2.9435) 
-2.3690*** 
(0.7757) 
-2.5586*** 
(0.7003) 
-1.0920** 
(0.5353) 
-0.8060* 
(0.4427) 
0.0480* 
(0.0282) 
0.0588* 
(0.0323) 
Gini 
793.027** 
(398.621)  
489.3719 
(331.503)  
305.043** 
(151.358) 
283.7654*
* 
(142.014) 
-43.954 
(63.363)  
-8.8998 
(37.4783)  
5.5135** 
(2.4653) 
6.0347** 
(2.3828) 
Density 
3.7790** 
(1.6474) 
3.4147* 
(1.9924) 
3.8122*** 
(1.0424) 
3.6336*** 
(1.2196) 
2.0898*** 
(0.5605 
1.6828** 
(0.7070) 
0.4406 
(0.3164) 
0.4298** 
(0.1935 
0.1936 
0.2271  
0.0140* 
(0.0075) 
0.0079* 
(0.005) 
Constant 
-683.037 
(2648.087) 
-270.606 
(2581.359
) 
-1627.835 
(2619.844) 
-1381.002 
(2514.866) 
-1048.307 
(1370.844) 
-678.8066 
(1355.519) 
81.022 
(231.420) 
62.465 
(227.813) 
168.9787 
143.6031 
281.189**
* 
(53.892) 
-9.180 
(8.036) 
-6.0824 
(4.481) 
Test that average 
autocovariance in 
residuals of order 1 
is 0.  Pr>z= 
0.672 0.2894 0.0279 0.0105 0.0365 0.0132 0.0881 0.0699 0.4427 0.4316 0.0189 0.0169 
Test that average 
autocovariance in 
residuals of order 2 
is 0.   Pr>z= 
0.981 0.6089 0.6891 0.5946 0.8418 0.803 0.6682 0.569 0.7383 0.7367 0.3467 0.3413 
Notes:  standard errors in parenthesis below coefficient.    *** Significant at .01.  ** Significant at .05.  * Significant at .10.   
Observations (N) = 184. Districts: 23. Periods: 8 (1
st
 half 2002 - 2
nd
 half 2005) 
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As already remarked, all the models include lagged dependent variables to capture 
the rigidity of crime rate from one year to another, thus I estimate using the dynamic 
panel technique developed by Arellano and Bond with robust standard errors. To 
minimize the possibility of simultaneous relationship between RELIEF and any of the 
Crime categories I also estimate equation (1) including RELIEF lagged one semester 
instead of the contemporaneous values9. As another robustness check I estimate 
equation (1) by OLS with fixed effects and robust standard errors. Results of both 
checks, shown in the Appendix, do not differ significantly from the ones obtained by 
Arellano-Bond technique with contemporaneous values of RELIEF10. 
My estimations show strong evidence that welfare spending is significantly and 
negatively associated with all categories of crime except for Homicide. The estimated 
coefficient of RELIEF for Property Crime, Robbery and Larceny is negative and 
statistical significant at 1%; for Total Crime and Aggravated Assault is significant at 
5% and for Crime against Persons at 10%.  Nonetheless, the influence of RELIEF on 
crime is very small. Table 5 present the elasticities of RELIEF with respect to each 
type of crime computed from mean values of the sample. A 1% increase in the 
number of recipients of the Unemployed-Headed Household Program diminish the 
total crime rate in less than 1% in all types of crime, with larceny showing the highest 
response with just 0.43%. Notice that my estimated elasticities show remarkable 
similitudes to the ones obtained by Johnson el al. (2007) in their study on the 
consequences of relief during the Great depression and to those of Savage et al. 
(2008) in their cross country analysis.  
As expected, the impact of poverty-alleviation aid on crime against person is very low 
and null on homicide. The value estimated for the elasticity of Aggravated Assault, 
close to the value of Robbery, may indicate that a substantial number of such type of 
offense is related to property crimes.  
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Federal government did not use crime rate to evaluate the need of relief spending (actually, they were guided by 
the percentage of population under the poverty line) so there is no simultaneity issue that could bias the RELIEF 
coefficient.  
10
 The Arellano-Bond estimation method is generally used when N is large (here the number of provinces) and T 
(time periods) is small. My data set has N= 23 and T= 8. See Tables 2A and 3A in the Appendix, 
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Table 5. Estimated Elasticity of Relief Spending (UHHP) with respect to each 
type of Crime 
 
Total 
Crime 
Property 
Crime Robbery Larceny 
Crime 
Against 
Persons 
Aggravated 
Assault 
Sample Mean  1869.9 1234.5 507.6 565.6 328.2 212.7 
Elasticity of Welfare 
Spending with 
respect to: 
-0.21 -0.39 -0.25 -0.43 -0.16 -0.28 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In the last decade there have been an interesting discussion regarding the effects of 
welfare spending on crime which has obvious public policy implications. The extant 
literature has focused mainly on empirical issues using data sets from various U.S. 
states in different periods. The international evidence has been scarce on this topic. 
This paper contributes to this empirical debate by testing how diverse types of crime 
were affected by the Unemployed-Headed Household Program, a massive cash 
transfer program launched by the Argentine government to alleviate the poverty 
resulting from the deep crisis of 2002.  
My findings suggest that welfare spending contributed to reduce total crime although 
the impact was rather weak. The analyses of various types of crime show that the 
influence of UHHP is greater in Property Crimes than Crime against Persons. As 
conjectured, poverty alleviation aid affected predominantly larceny. Apparently, the 
amount of cash transfer received by beneficiaries of the UHHP, influenced mostly the 
opportunity cost of committing minor offenses, like the ones considered under the 
category of larceny. The same reasoning fits the results obtained for Robbery and 
Aggravated Assault that were hardly influenced by UHHP and for Homicide that was 
not affected at all by poverty alleviation aid. Relief spending might have also helped 
to diminish crime indirectly by improving social control and lowering strain, but the 
limitations of my data set does not allow the identification of each effect.  
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Table 1A. Definition of Variables  
Type of 
variable 
Variable Definition 
Dependent 
Crimeit Total offenses per 100,000 inhabitants in semester t at district i 
Propertyit 
Property Crime offenses per 100,000 inhabitants in 
semester t at district i. Property crimes include robberies, 
larcenies and other property crimes 
Robberyit 
Taking or attempting to take anything of value from a 
person by force or threat of force or violence per 100,000 
inhabitants in semester t at district i. Attempted robberies 
are included. Robberies aggravated by injuries or death 
are excluded 
Larcenyit 
Unlawfully taking property from another without force, 
violence or fraud (attempted larcenies are included) per 
100,000 inhabitants in semester t at district i. Attempted 
larcenies are included 
Personsit Crime against persons per 100,000 inhabitants in semester t at district i. 
Assaultit 
Aggravated assaults per 100,000 inhabitants in semester t 
at district i. 
Homicideit Homicide offenses per 100,000 inhabitants in semester t at district i 
Key 
independent 
variable 
Reliefit 
Number of beneficiaries of Unemployed-Headed 
Household Program (Programa Jefes y Jefas de Hogar 
Desocupados) per 100,000 inhabitants in semester t at 
district i. (Monthly Average) 
Control 
Variables 
Activityit Turnover tax collection per capita in district i at semester t  
(in constant pesos of 2004) 
Unemploymentit Rate of unemployment of district i in semester t. 
Giniit Gini coefficient of district i in semester t. 
Densityit Population per square kilometers of district i at semester t. 
Note: Robbery and Larceny are included in the property crime category. Aggravated assault and homicide are 
included in the category Crime against Persons. 
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Table 2A. Robustness Check I:  Lagged Welfare program   
Estimation Method: GMM (Arellano-Bond) with robust standard errors 
Variables 
Dependent variables 
Property Crime Robbery Larceny 
Lagged dependent variable 
0.4699*** 
(0.1228) 
0.4370*** 
(0.1357) 
0.3311*** 
(0.1224) 
RELIEF (t-1) 
-3.7421*** 
(0.6939) 
-1.4788*** 
(0.3159) 
-1.7549*** 
(0.4459) 
Activity 
-10.4784** 
(4.6850) 
-5.6188** 
(2.5441) 
-6.7015*** 
(2.6139) 
Unemployment 
5.0165 
(4.6191) 
3.3048* 
(1.8267) 
4.9294* 
(2.6797) 
Density 
2.1708*** 
(0.7976) 
1.5517*** 
(0.4505) 
 
Constant 
-578.055 
(1641.31) 
-663.084 
(972.501 
469.7943*** 
(111.7638) 
Test that average autocovariance in residuals of 
order 1 is 0.  Pr>z= 
0.0171 0.0072 0.0142 
Test that average autocovariance in residuals of 
order 2 is 0.   Pr>z= 
0.5980 0.7568 0.8006 
Notes:  standard errors in parenthesis below coefficient.    *** Significant at .01.  ** Significant at .05.  * Significant at .10.   
Observations (N) = 184. Districts: 23. Periods: 8 (1
st
 half 2002 - 2
nd
 half 2005)  
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Table 3A. Robustness Check II: OLS with Fixed Effects 
Estimation Method: OLS with fixed-effects and robust standard errors 
Dependent variables 
Total Crime Property Crime Robbery Larceny 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
0.6190*** 
(0.0992 
0.6264*** 
(0.0980) 
0.6720*** 
(0.0802) 
0.6668*** 
(0.0782) 
0.6352*** 
(0.0850) 
0.6513*** 
(0.0793) 
0.6538*** 
(0.0802) 
0.6919*** 
(0.06849) 
RELIEF  -2.5831 (1.5999) 
-2.9992* 
(1.5540) 
-3.2102** 
(1.4307) 
-3.5718** 
(1.3522) 
-0.7591* 
(0.4232) 
-1.0138** 
(0.3724) 
-1.837** 
(0.7378) 
-3.066** 
(1.450) 
Activity -9.5474*** (2.5932) 
-13.375*** 
(3.319) 
-9.6239*** 
(2.3571) 
-8.0631** 
(3.4886) 
-23.52*** 
(0.954) 
-3.2762** 
(1.3276) 
-6.011*** 
(1.1425) 
-7.404** 
(3.511) 
Unemployment 3.4637 (5.2013)  
4.4049 
(3.8987)  
2.7481 
(1.7916)  
3.0802 
(2.3029) 
6.9877** 
(3.402) 
Gini 142.0621 (248.7794)  
204.726 
(204.177) 
371.704** 
(179.156) 
75.420 
(112.687) 
179.493* 
(99.910) 
95.9069 
(95.7740)  
Density 2.5983*** (0.5620) 
2.7875*** 
(0.37028) 
2.86955*** 
(0.5111)  
0.921*** 
(0.1949)  
1.624*** 
(0.302)  
Constant -910.470* (505.749) 
-876.856* 
(496.408) 
-1303.733 
(398.194) 
473.437*** 
(118.144) 
-429.429 
(164.631) 
167.91** 
(60.450) 
-828.5*** 
(227.953) 
551.87*** 
(89.295) 
R2 within 0.4115 0.4050 0.5223 0.5008 0.5104 0.4893 0.5389 0.5088 
R2 between 0.2537 0.2514 0.2295 0.9569 0.3992 0.9792 0.1004 0.9593 
R2 overall 0.2356 0.2333 0.2106 0.9036 0.3773 0.9387 0.0901 0.9041 
Notes:  standard errors in parenthesis below coefficient.    *** Significant at .01.  ** Significant at .05.  * Significant at .10.   
Observations (N) = 184. Districts: 23. Periods: 8 (1
st
 half 2002 - 2
nd
 half 2005)  
 
